Rao wrote the blog article Substantive Dignity-Dwarf-throwing, Burqa Bans, and Welfare Rights as well as more-formal articles cited therein:
In a much-discussed French case, Mr. Wackenheim, a dwarf, made his living by allowing himself to be thrown for sport. The mayors of several cities banned dwarf tossing events. Mr. Wackenheim challenged the orders on the grounds that they interfered with his economic liberty and right to earn a living. The case went to the Conseil d’Etat (the supreme administrative court), which upheld the bans on the grounds that dwarf throwing affronted human dignity, which was part of the “public order” controlled by the municipal police. The Wackenheim case demonstrates how a substantive understanding of dignity can be used to coerce individuals by forcing upon them a particular understanding of dignity irrespective of their individual choices.
The issue is not whether laws prohibiting dwarf throwing, burqa wearing, prostitution, or pornography may be desirable social policy. Rather these examples demonstrate that the conception of dignity used to defend such policies is not that of human agency and freedom of choice, but rather represents a particular moral view of what dignity requires. These laws do not purport to maximize individual freedom, but instead regulate how individuals must behave in order to maintain dignity (and in the case of criminal prohibitions, stay out of jail).
For the related academic article see Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law Notre Dame Law Review volume 86, pages 183-271, particularly the "Dwarf Throwing" section on pages 226-227.
So in conclusion, she defended allowing dwarfs who want to be thrown, to be thrown, as opposed to outlawing the practice.